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ABSTRACT
Diversity in the judiciary is essential to ensure impartiality, public confidence,
and the perception that all members of society are represented on the bench. Minorities
and women are significantly underrepresented as judges in Florida in proportion to their
numbers in the general population.
Because we live in an increasingly global world, diversity is best described when
people of different races, colors, ethnicity and genders work to develop a mutual respect
for each other. It was important to use diversity in this research because it required
recognition, understanding, and acceptance of the special contribution that each member
of a group can make.
The documentation review method was used to measure the data collected in this
research. The advantages for using this method were first, to obtain comprehensive and
historical information that already exists and secondly, to obtain data which demonstrates
few biases about the information.
I used correlation as a non-experimental, description method because the
variables are not directly manipulated, as they would be if used in an experimental
method. This method of research is really more of a mathematical technique for
summarizing data. This study was designed to determine the degree and direction of
relationship between two or more variables or measures of behavior.
Diversity in 2004 judicial appointments is a high priority in Florida’s present
administration. Their goal is to have a judicial system composed of judges who reflect the
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people they serve. Since judges have so much influence over the lives of people of the
state, it is important that all Floridians perceive the judiciary legitimate. Having a diverse
judiciary serves the goal.
The Bush/Jennings team appointed; 1) the first African American woman, Judge
Peggy Quince to the Florida Supreme Court (with the agreement of Governor Lawton
Chiles); 2) minorities to 53 judicial positions including the first Hispanic Supreme Court
Justice Raoul Cantero to the Supreme Court; 3) 26 African American, 26 Hispanics, 1
other); 4) women to 66 judicial position; and, 5) the first Haitian-American judge, Judge
Fred Seraphin to the Miami Dade County Court.
The judicial system has an obligation to provide equal opportunity to the extent
that females, minorities, and people of color have the temperament, the legal educational
background, the skills, and the abilities necessary to sit on Florida’s bench. The legal
profession also has an obligation to encourage more minorities and women to consider a
career in law. The governor’s most recent selections indicate that he is serious about
improving diversity on the Florida bench.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Professor Sherrilyn Ifill contends that diversity in the judiciary is essential to
ensure impartiality, public confidence, and the perception that all members of society are
represented on the bench and has offered two distinct rationales for racial diversity
among judges. Minorities and women are significantly underrepresented as judges in
Florida in proportion to their numbers in the general population, comprising only 10.7%
of the 798 judges in the state, 5.6% are African American, 4.9% are Hispanic and 0.1%
are of another minority group (Office of the State Courts Administrator, August 1999).
Minority females, at 3.5% of all judges, are particularly scarce on Florida's bench (ref.
see above). Minorities are virtually absent from the higher courts, serving primarily 7.7%
on the circuit courts (ref. see above).
Because we live in an increasingly global world, diversity is best described when
people of different races, colors, ethnicity and genders work to develop a mutual respect
for each other. It was important to use diversity in this research because it required
recognition, understanding, and acceptance of the special contribution that each member
of a group can make.
First Ifill argues that the creation of a racially diverse bench can introduce
traditionally excluded perspectives and values into judicial decision-making. She further
states that the interplay of diverse views and perspectives can enrich judicial decisionmaking. Secondly, she argued that racial diversity on the bench also encourages judicial
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impartiality, by ensuring that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial
decision-making. (Ifill).
Given the wide range of legal and political scholarship on judicial recruitment and
selection, serious gaps still persist in our understanding of the persistent lack of diversity
on most of Florida's courts. Before political scientists, legal scholars and practitioners can
seek solutions to the possibility that there is a lack of racial, gender and ethnic diversity
on the bench, there must be a reexamination of the nature and extent to which persons
who are already sitting on these courts reflect the racial, gender and ethnic diversity of
Florida. But, is there data which supports the theory of the lack of diversity? This
research will attempt to answer the following questions:
1.

What is diversity and is there a lack of diversity on Florida's courts?

2.

What viable remedies can be fashioned to address the problem of under
representation of minorities and females?

3.

How do we go about identifying the appropriate "pool" of potential
females and judges of color with respect to judicial recruitment?

In the 1970s and 1980s, women and minorities began entering the legal profession
in increasing numbers. Although still scarce, African American, Hispanic, and female
lawyers were no longer novelties in Florida. These pioneers were a catalyst in compelling
the legal profession – indeed, the entire justice system – to reflect on fairness within the
legal profession and the justice system those professionals serve. At the same time,
claims of racial and ethnic bias in the justice system were increasing, even after decades
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of laws and affirmative action designed to end discrimination. In late 1989, the Florida
Supreme Court began an unprecedented examination of racial and ethnic bias in the
justice system. That study culminated with the issuance of final reports and
recommendations in 1990 and 1991. Following the study, leaders in all three branches of
government came together to work on eradicating racial and ethnic bias from our courts
and legal system. The Florida Legislature responded with a major bill in the spring of
1991, one described at the time by then-Governor Lawton Chiles as "packed with
revisions that make a difference." Those legislative revisions and other changes in all
three branches of government over the past ten years have resulted in:
•

Appointment of unprecedented numbers of minorities to Florida's bench
by both Governor Jeb Bush and former Governor Lawton Chiles.

•

Judicial elections or appointment: The election of judges and the resulting
impact on the diversity of Florida’s bench.

•

Improve the judicial nominating/appointment process as it impacts on the
diversity of the bench and require that minorities be placed on the Judicial
Nominating Commissions.

•

Creation and funding of a minority law student scholarship program for
the purpose of recruiting more minorities into the legal profession.

Appointment of Unprecedented Numbers of Minorities to Florida's
Bench by both Governor Jeb Bush and former Governor Lawton Chiles
Minority judicial appointments increased significantly under the gubernatorial
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terms of former Governor Chiles. Likewise, Governor Bush has made several minority
appointments and continues to call for a more diverse judiciary. In March of 2000, Bush
told Bar members that his efforts to appoint minority judges have been hindered by the
lack of diversity in the pools of applicants and in the recommendation lists he has
received from the JNCs. Bush said minority applicants "have not received a fair shot in
the past and I do not think they will receive one now." The Florida Bar, through the
decisions of its Board of Governors and the efforts of its Judicial Nominating Procedures
Committee, should expressly establish, as a top priority, the increase of minority
representation among the Bar's appointees to the judicial nominating commissions.
There has been a significant improvement in the diversity of Florida's judges.
Both Governor Jeb Bush and former Governor Lawton Chiles are to be commended for
appointing unprecedented numbers of minorities to Florida's bench. Minority judges at
the trial court level have increased from 5.8% in 1990 to 11.4% in 2000, minority judges
at the district court of appeal level have increased from only 3.5% in 1990 to 14.7% in
2000, and minority judges at the Supreme Court level have increased from 14.2% in 1990
to 28.5% in 2000. Despite these advances, the judiciary as a whole still does not
accurately reflect the rich cultural diversity of our state. Additionally, racial disparities
are more pronounced in various geographical areas. Until the Florida courts fully reflect
the diversity of our citizens, leaders in all three branches of government should reiterate
their aspirations for diversity among both judicial nominating commission membership
and judicial appointees.

4

Judicial elections or appointment: The Election of Judges
and the Resulting Impact on the Diversity of Florida’s Bench
The Florida Legislature should, in connection with its preparation for the session
on reapportionment, fund and conduct computer-assisted analyses of the feasibility of
devising judicial election subdistricts which would tend to increase minority
representation while avoiding fragmentation and parochialism. Once concrete examples
of the configuration of subdistricts are devised, the state will be in a better position to
determine whether a change to single-member districts or subdistricts should be
implemented through an amendment to the State Constitution.
This recommendation appears to have been rendered moot by intervening events
of the past decade, including the adoption in 1998 by Florida voters of a constitutional
amendment allowing counties to opt into a system of merit selection and retention for
trial court judges. Over the past decade, there has been considerable discussion and
debate over the method by which more racial and ethnic minorities reach the Florida
bench: election or appointment. The election of judges and the resulting impact on the
diversity of Florida’s bench should be monitored.

The Judicial Nominating/Appointment Process
The original recommendations and implementation status demonstrated that the
Florida Legislature should mandate representative minority attorney and citizen
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membership on each judicial nominating commission. Although this procedure was
implemented, it was later overturned.
The legislature enacted this recommendation in the spring of 1991. Though ruled
unconstitutional in the mid-1990's, the law had time in the intervening years to bring
about change and improvement. In the first round of judicial nominating commission
(JNC) appointments made by Governor Chiles following release of the report, 23 out of
26 individuals appointed were racial or ethnic minorities. In the following year, Chiles
appointed 19 minorities out of 26 seats, to the JNCs. The diversification achieved was
unprecedented and widely hailed as historic. Legislation was considered in the spring of
2000 that would have encouraged (rather than mandated) minority representation on the
JNCs, but for unrelated reasons the bill did not pass.
The Florida Supreme Court should instruct each judicial nominating commission
to provide explicitly, by rule, that racial and ethnic diversity of Florida's bench is a
desirable objective and, as such, an element which shall be considered by all judicial
nominating commissions when making recommendations on appointments to the bench.
Please note that the Florida Supreme Court has no authority over the actions of
the judicial nominating commissions. Each judicial nominating commission should, by
rule, establish a model plan for recruiting qualified minority candidates for judicial
appointment, updating the plan as appropriate to account for experience gained in the
recruitment process. Particular attention should be paid to the recruitment of minority
females for judicial appointment. Judicial nominating commissions should be required to
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provide to the Governor a statement certifying compliance with the commission's
minority recruitment plan when submitting recommendations for judicial appointments.
In addition, the Florida Supreme Court should require the Judicial Nominating
Procedures Committee of The Florida Bar and each judicial nominating commission to
submit an annual report detailing each commission's record of increasing the number of
minorities recommended for appointment to Florida's bench. This was implemented in
part, but in late 1999, Governor Bush chastised the JNCs for sending him 65 names, of
which only 10 were women and 5 were African American. Bush urged the JNCs to
"eliminate any informal barriers that may affect the diversity of the lists I receive." On
March 30, 2000, the JNCs amended their rules to require that new members receive
diversity training, racial information be collected from applicants on a voluntary basis,
and all judicial openings be advertised with minority bar associations. Please note that the
Florida Supreme Court has no authority over the actions of the judicial nominating
commissions. The Governor should establish, as a top priority, the increase of minorities
among his appointments to Florida's bench. Although implemented, the progress is
continuing.
In 1991, Florida Bar President Benjamin Hill vigorously encouraged Bar
members to nominate minorities and placed ads in legal publications encouraging
minorities to apply for JNC seats. In its first round of appointments after the
Commission’s report, the Bar appointed five minorities, out of 26 seats, in what Hill
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described then as a "dramatic" improvement in the Bar's record. The number of
subsequent minority Bar appointees is unknown.
The ability of the judicial nominating commissions to influence who is appointed
to the bench cannot be overstated. The public needs assurances that JNC actions are
explainable and accountable. Furthermore, The Florida Bar should account for the
diversity of their JNC appointments, especially if they are advocating the adoption of a
merit selection and retention process for trial judges. The Florida Bar should develop a
mechanism to report on the diversity and composition of the judicial nominating
commissions, on an annual basis.

Creation and Funding of a Minority Law Student Scholarship Program
for the purpose of recruiting more Minorities into the Legal Profession
To achieve true diversity in the legal profession, Florida must encourage an
increase in the number of racial and ethnic minority lawyers and foster their professional
development. During the 2000 session, the Florida Legislature approved the
establishment of two new public law schools, with the goal of increasing diversity among
Florida’s legal profession. The Florida Bar Foundation had to discontinue its minority
scholarship program, due to funding problems; however, legislatively-funded and ABAfunded minority scholarships are available and must continue. Also, undergraduate
preparation for law school should continue to be an important area of focus in order to
increase diversity among students and to provide racial and ethnic minority students with
the support they need to successfully complete law school.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The History of Florida Judicial Selection and the Silent De Facto Conspiracy
The history of selection methods and term lengths for Florida judges are
prescribed in the state's constitution. However, if any changes occur, it must be
accomplished through constitutional amendment. Constitutional amendments are
proposed by joint resolution agreed to by three fifths of the members of each house of the
legislature, or by initiative petition signed by a number of electors in each of one half of
the state's congressional districts, and of the state as a whole, equal to 8% of the votes
cast in each district and in the state as a whole in the most recent presidential election.
Formal changes made since its inception of the selection method have been made
accordingly.
In 1845 circuit court judges, who also served on the Supreme Court, were elected
by the legislature. Judges served initial five-year terms, followed by life tenure if
reelected. In 1848, terms of circuit court judges reduced to eight years and three years
later, the Legislature provided for the supreme court to have its own justices, who were
elected by the people to six-year terms.

In 1861, the supreme court justices were

appointed by the governor with senate consent to six-year terms and circuit court judges
were elected by the people to six-year terms. In 1868, judges were appointed by the
governor with senate consent. Supreme court justices appointed for life; circuit court
judges appointed to eight-year terms. By 1875, terms of circuit court judges reduced to
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six years and the 1885 supreme court justices were elected by the people to six-year
terms.
The constitutional amendment in 1942 reinstated elections for circuit court judges
and fifteen years later, the district courts of appeal were created. In 1971, the Legislature
established nonpartisan judicial elections. Governor Askew took the first step toward
merit selection with an executive order calling for the use of nominating commissions to
fill judicial vacancies. The 1972 voters approved a constitutional amendment calling for
the use of nominating commissions to fill vacancies at all levels of the judiciary and by
1976 the voters approved a constitutional amendment calling for merit selection and
retention of appellate judges. The reform effort was spearheaded by Governor Askew,
Chief Justice Overton, and State Representative D'Alemberte. The 1998 voters approved
a constitutional amendment allowing circuits and counties to opt for merit selection and
retention of trial judges.
Historically, Florida state courts were the non-controversial servant of the state's
dominant political forces.1 That posture is typical of state courts throughout the United
States. Since state courts are intimately tied to the political structure of the state, they
tend to be creatures of local government infused with local values and mores.2 The
Florida Supreme Court's position of ideological congruence with the dominant political
culture, however, began to unravel in the 1960s.
1

In fact, on of the authors of this article entitled his review of Florida courts
accordingly, See Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4.
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Before conflicts began to occur, several changes were made in the judicial
selection process in an effort by the dominant conservative political forces to maintain
control over the courts. Although nominally Democratic in party affiliation until the late
1960s, these forces controlled the Florida Bar, a so-called integrated bar, in which
membership is mandatory for all practicing attorneys in the state.3 Traditional political
practice in the 1960s was that incumbent judges would resign their office a year or so
prior to retirement. The governor would then fill that vacancy based on recommendations
from the Bar and other political associates. The appointee would thereby be able to stand
for re-election as an incumbent. In a partisan election, there was an extremely high
probability of reelection. If the judge served a full term, in contrast, the electorate would
directly choose the successor in partisan elections without the imprimatur of
gubernatorial approval.4
The "silent de facto conspiracy that existed among the judiciary, the Florida Bar,
and the various governors"5, has straightforward structural foundations. Practicing
attorneys are reticent to run against sitting judges for fear that they may lose, earning the
ire and enmity of the judges who will decide their cases. The bar association itself tends
to support the incumbent candidate, making it even more difficult for challengers to
2
3

See Neubauer, supra note 3, at 174.
Neubauer, supra note 3, at 131-32.

4

Atkins, supra note 29, at 153-154; see also Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4,
at 156-157.
5

Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 157.
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gather support.6 Moreover, judicial elections are bland and non-controversial due, in
large part, to canons of ethics that prevent judicial candidates from staking out issue
positions during the campaign.7 This dynamic makes it difficult for voters to evaluate and
distinguish candidates for judicial office. In fact, those sitting judges who are not reelected usually fail in their bid due to personal scandal.8 "For example, one [Florida]
judge was found to be printing pornography on his office computer. Local attorneys and
other judges had been aware of the drinking problem of another judge for years, but no
effective action was taken until he hit a parked police car after a liquid lunch."9
Accordingly, partisan changes in the composition of the bench occurred with much less
frequency and at a much slower pace than in the other two branches.10
The historical Democratic Party dominated the state of Florida. The election of
Claude Kirk as governor first demonstrated the effect of potential Republican voters in

6

Id.; see also Neubauer, supra note 3, at 170.

7

E.g., Anthony Champagne & Greg Thieleman, Awareness of Trial Court Judges,
76 Judicature 271-77 (1991); Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial
Candidates
.
8
Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 157.
9

Id.

10

Also, because are elected, they must campaign and raise funds to pay for the
expense of that effort. This process inevitably raises questions of impropriety and the
legitimacy of judges who seek contributions from the lawyers who may later appear in
their courts. See, e.g., Neubauer, supra note 3, at 170; see also Burton Atkins, Judges'
Perspective on Judicial Selection, 49 St. Gov't 182 (1976).
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the state. This changed the partisan dynamic of the selection process since Republican
candidates now had a fighting chance to first attain office and later to shape the judiciary
through appointments. Indeed, Governor Kirk's appointees to the bench furthered this
transformation appointments. On a statewide basis, however, Governor Kirk's Republican
Supreme Court appointees fell to Democratic challengers in the subsequent general
elections.11 This trend reflected the Democratic dominance of state politics despite Kirk's
election in 1966, and a split in the Democratic ranks eventually developed. His opponent,
Robert King High (the mayor of Miami), was perceived as too liberal, so critical financial
support went to Kirk. This, coupled with the usual decline in turnout of less educated
Democratic voters in the off-year election of 1966, proved insurmountable for King,
especially given the animosity against the Democratic National Party in North Florida
after the 1964 presidential election during which North Florida voters overwhelmingly
supported Republican candidate Barry Goldwater.
Regardless, the harbingers of change were clear, leading to several changes in
judicial election procedures. Although these changes were intended to retain Democratic
judges, their general effect was to improve Republican candidates' chances of attaining
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This trend reflected the Democratic dominance of state politics despite Kirk's
election in 1966, and a split in the Democratic ranks eventually developed. His opponent,
Robert King High (the mayor of Miami), was perceived as too liberal, so critical financial
support went to Kirk. This coupled with the usual decline in turnout of less educated
Democratic voters in the off-year election of 1966, proved insurmountable for King,
especially given the animosity against the Democratic National Party in North Florida
after the1964 presidential election during which North Florida voters overwhelmingly
supported Republican candidate Barry Goldwater.
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office by moving major statewide races to an off-year election cycle.12 By the 1980s, the
Republican party was clearly on the rise, capturing more legislative seats with each
election.13 The House first came under Republican control in 1994, and the Senate
followed in 1996.14 For the first time since Reconstruction, the Republicans were in the
majority.15 During the same time period, in 1994, Republican gubernatorial candidate
John Ellis "Jeb" Bush lost to Democrat Lawton Chiles, a former U.S. Senator.16 This
defeat largely nullified Republican legislative gains within the judiciary since it preserved
the order, Democratic elements in control of access to the bench. Bush, however,
ultimately prevailed and won the post in 1998, defeating former Democratic Lieutenant
Governor Buddy McKay.17 Hence, beginning in 1998, the Republicans held control of
both the governorship and the legislature, two key elements for influence over the
judiciary.18

12

Fla. Stat. Chapter 100.041(2001).

13

See generally Michael Barone & Richard E. Cohen, the Almanac of American
Politics 2003, at 360-63(2001).
14

Id. at 362.

15

Wayne L. Francis & Elizabeth G. Williams, The Legislature and the legislative
Process in Government and Politics in Florida 124-46, 127 (Robert J. Huckshorn ed., 2d
ed. 1998).
16

Id. at 364.

17

Id. at 365.

18

Id.
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Changes in the Judicial Selection Processes
Over Time: From Partisanship to the Merit System
Largely because Governor Kirk's judicial appointees were considered to be
partisan, Florida voters made the selection process19 for all levels of courts nonpartisan.20
Thus, in 1972, Article V of the Florida Constitution was amended to replace partisan
selection methods with nonpartisan judicial elections. This change from partisan to
nonpartisan elections coincided with the state becoming a more competitive, two-party
system and the decline of the Florida Democratic party's historical hegemony.21
Moreover, in 1972 an amendment was passed instituting and appointment process to fill
interim vacancies. This enhanced the governor's power over the judiciary because
appointed judges had rarely encountered even minimal opposition and even more rarely
were defeated due to the difficulties of opposing an incumbent.22

19

The Emphasis on elections to select members of the judiciary arose during the
Jacksonian era, which emphasized the democratization of the political process and sought
to diminish the elitism of the judiciary. Most states from 1832 to 1933 adopted such
judicial election. E.g., Atkins, supra note 29, at 152.
20

There are four levels of courts within the Florida judicial hierarchy: the Florida
Supreme Court, the district courts of appeal (5 in number), the circuit courts (20 in
number), and the county courts (67 in number, one of each county). Handberg &
Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 151-52. Circuit courts and county courts have primarily
original jurisdiction to try cases. Id.
21

Indeed, this correlation has been observed in other states as well. Atkins, supra
note 29, at 153. See generally Burnham, supra note 31; Lamis, Southern Politics, supra
note 31; Lamis, Two-party South, supra note 31; Beck, supra note 31; Bullock, supra note
31; Carmines, supra note 31; Knuckey, Explaining Republican Success, supra note 31;
Knuckey, Ideological Realignment, supra note 31.
22

Atkins notes that of the forty-six Republican judges who responded to his
mailed survey, about one-half.
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The larger effect of this change from partisan to nonpartisan elections was to
diminish gradually the link between the courts and the partisan dynamics of the state.
This created a lag between changes in public opinion, quickly felt by the executive and
the legislative branches, and the composition and decision-making of the Florida
judiciary. Although the Republican Party was on the rise in Florida, that change was not
mirrored in the courts over which traditional political forces, like the Florida Bar, still
held sway. Democrats also retained control of the legislature while Republican
governors, J. Claude Kirk23 and Bob Martinez,24 were elected for only single terms. The
Republican Party's ability to impact the judiciary was therefore limited.25
The system of nonpartisan election of judges continued unabated until a series of
incidents in the mid-1970s involving four of the Florida Supreme Court's seven justices.
Two of the justices were accused of attempting to influence separate decisions in lower
courts. The allegations were so serious that the legislature invoked the rarely used
impeachment process. Both justices resigned before the formal removal process was
consummated, but they were later disbarred. One later died as a fugitive from drug-

23

Not only did the Democrats control the legislature, but they also controlled the
cabinet with which Kirk had a running feud. It was rumored that Kirk spend more time
out of Tallahassee than in it because of this. Michael Gannon, A History of Florida to
1990, in Government and Politics in Florida 50 (Robert J. Huckshorn ed, 1991).
24

Martinez was only Florida's second Republican governor since Reconstruction.

Id. at 56.
25

Democrats Reuben Askew (1971-79) and Robert "Bob' Graham (1979-1986)
intervened between Kirk's and Martinez's tenures. Thereafter, Lawton Chiles served two
terms until Jeb Bush was elected in 1998. Id. at 52-56.
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smuggling charges.26 At about the same time, it became publicly known that the supreme
court's chief justice suffered from alcoholism to the point of impairing his work. The
Judicial Qualifications Commission27 notified him that if he did not seek assistance with
his dependency, he would be removed from office. A fourth justice was involuntarily
committed "to Shands Hospital in Gainesville for a formal psychiatric evaluation because
of his erratic behavior under stress."28 He ultimately was able to return to work and
served as the tribunal's chief justice until the mandatory retirement age of seventy.29
Because of the lack of justices during this period, lower court judges had to be appointed
to form a quorum so the court could meet its responsibilities.30
The cumulative effect of these events damaged the legitimacy of the Florida court
system in general and the Supreme Court in particular. Many of the state's legal and
political elites grew uneasy because they believed that he apolitical image of the judiciary
was being eroded.31 A movement that the League of Women Voters and the Florida Bar
led arose to change the selection process for the supreme court and the district courts of
appeal to a more indirect, presumably less partisan method.32 Consequently, Florida'

26

Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 158.

27

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
28

32

Id. Reformers advocate the adoption of the merit system because it circumvents
the structural problems with candidate recruitment and the voters' lack of information.
E.g., Neubauer, supra note 3, at 171-72.
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judges were selected differently depending upon their level within the hierarchy.33 A
1976 referendum changed the method of selection for appellate court judges from one
governed by nonpartisan elections to a merit selection system.34 While the trial courts
formally retain the nonpartisan election mode, their judges continued the long-standing,
informal practice of resigning prior to their terms' end allowing the governor to appoint a
successor to reap the benefits of incumbency. The state legislature recognized this reality
and enacted a modified merit selection system to diminish, although not eliminate,
gubernatorial influence on local judge selection. Under the revised system, the governor
would choose an interim successor from a list of potential nominees compiled by court
specified judicial nominating commissions.35 This system was much like the one in place

33

See Bast, supra note 12, at 58; Lanier, supra note 23, at 10.

34

Fla. Const. art., V, § 11. Under this system, a Judicial Nominating Commission
composes a list of three to six potential nominees, from which the governor makes the
ultimate selection. After a period of approximately one year, the selected judge stands
unopposed in a retention election in which voters in his district decides whether to
continue him in office. If successful, the judge serves a six-year term. If not, then the
governor chooses another candidate and the process begins anew. Fla. Const. art V, § 10.
See generally Lyle Warrick, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Compendium of
Provisions passim (2d ed. 1993); Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of
Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53-117 (1986) (discussing the merit selection system); Mark
S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and Federal Appellate
Benches: A Cross-Time Comparison, 1985 to 1999, 85 Judicature 84-92
(2001)(discussing the link between judicial selection method and the incidence of women
and minorities becoming appellate judges).
35

There are currently twenty-six judicial nominating commissions, one for the
supreme court, one for each of the five district courts of appeal, and one for each of the
twenty judicial circuits, the latter having jurisdiction over appointments to the circuit and
county courts throughout the state. Fla. Const. art. V, § 11.
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for the state's appellate courts.36 Once the interim term expires, the sitting judge then
stands in a competitive election (unlike members of the appellate bench who stand
unopposed) and, if elected, serves a full, six-year term.
Efforts to extend the merit election system for all trial bench appointments – not
simply interim one – began immediately after the 1976 vote. The opponents of such
efforts perceived merit selection as the Bar's attempt to disenfranchise them just as their
turn at judicial power came in the political roulette wheel. In North Florida, primarily
Jacksonville, local African-American leaders resisted such changes because they believed
that the adoption of this reform would leave the courts hostage to the lawyers, especially
the defense bar, whom they believed held contrary policy views.37 In South Florida,
Hispanic voters, particularly members of the Cuban-American community, raised similar
objections. Despite this resistance, or perhaps because of it, the now Republican
controlled Florida legislature passed two referenda items authorizing constitutional
amendments. The legislature did this thinking that only narrow groups opposed the
extension of the merit system beyond the appellate bench. The legislature did this
thinking that only narrow groups opposed the extension of the merit system beyond the
appellate bench. The first referenda was whether to adopt a local option permitting voters
residing in specific counties and within the state's judicial circuits to choose to adopt the
merit system for all judges in their political subdivision. The referendum was put to a
36

Fla. Const. art. V, § 11.
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See Dye, supra note 17, at 6-7 (discussing the partisan allegiance of voters in
North Florida and Jacksonville).
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vote in November 1998 and the voters choose to create such an option for both county
and circuit subdivisions by a margin of about fourteen percent.38

Judicial Nominating Commissions
Because the composition of judicial nominating commissions may affect who the
nominees will ultimately be, three major studies have explored the gender and racial
diversity of these commissions. In 1973, Allan Ashman and James Alfini surveyed
members of nominating commissions in thirteen states. Beth Henschen, Robert Moog,
and Steven Davis conducted a similar survey of nominating commissioners in thirty-four
states in 1989. The most recent study of the racial and gender makeup of nominating
commissions was conducted by Kevin Esterling and Seth Andersen, who gathered
demographic information on nominating commissioners in eight states in the 1990s.
In the first major study, Ashman and Alfini found that nominating commissioners
were overwhelmingly white and male. More specifically, nominating commissioners
were 97.8 percent white and 89.6 percent male. This study also compared the
characteristics of lawyer and non-lawyer commissioners. Only two of 194 lawyer
members were non-white, and only one was a woman. Of the 153 lay members, 3.3
percent were non-white, and 22.3 percent were women.
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The full text of the ballot measure and the vote data can be obtained at the
Secretary of State's homepage at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. The corresponding
amendment can be found in article V, section 10(b)(1)-(3) of the state constitution. Fla.
Const. art. V, § 10(b)(1)-(3).
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Sixteen years later, Henschen, Moog and Davis reported notable gains in the
representation of women on judicial nominating commissions. Twenty-five percent of
commissioner respondents were women, and the percentage of women among attorney
commissioners had increased to 10 percent. This study showed only slight increases in
the proportion of minority commissioners, with 7 percent of commissioners being nonwhite. As in the Ashman and Alfini study, there were fewer minorities among lawyer
members, 5 percent, than lay members, 14 percent. The Henschen study also reported
significant variation in the racial and gender composition of nominating commissions
across states. This variation was later confirmed in the data collected by Esterling and
Andersen. States with a significant proportion of Hispanic commissioners included New
Mexico, at 30.9 percent, and Arizona, at 25.8 percent, while states with substantial
African-American representation were Tennessee, at 20 percent, and Florida, at 18.1
percent. The extent of gender diversity on these commissions ranged from 22 percent in
Alabama to nearly 47 percent in Tennessee.
Esterling and Andersen examined the effects of gender and racial diversity within
nominating commissions on the gender and racial diversity of applicants and nominees.
In the five states for which data was available, there was some evidence that diverse
commissions attracted more diverse applicants and selected more diverse nominees.
The Florida judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, the district courts of
appeal, the circuit courts, and the county courts. Appellate judges are chosen through a
merit selection and retention process, and trial judges are chosen in nonpartisan elections.
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However, vacancies on the trial courts are filled by the governor from candidates
recommended by a judicial nominating commission.
There are twenty-six judicial nominating commissions that screen applicants for
vacancies on Florida courts and recommend qualified candidates to the governor: the
statewide nominating commission for the supreme court, a commission for each of the
five district courts of appeal, and a commission for each of the twenty judicial circuits.
For all vacancies on the supreme court and district courts of appeal and for mid-term
vacancies on the circuit and county courts, the appropriate nominating commission
submits a list of three to six nominees. The governor must appoint one of the
commission's nominees.
Each nominating commission consists of nine members appointed by the
governor. Four members are lawyers appointed from lists of nominees submitted by the
Florida Bar. Of the remaining five members, at least two must be lawyers. Members must
be residents of the jurisdiction the commission serves. In making the appointments, the
governor is to ensure that, to the extent possible, the membership of each commission
reflects the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity and geographic distribution of the relevant
jurisdiction. Members serve four-year terms.
The question was put to voters in the 2000 election and by 2001, the Legislature
revised the statute relating to the appointment of members of the state's judicial
nominating commissions. Prior to the change, three lawyer members were appointed by
the Florida Bar, three members were appointed by the governor and could be either
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lawyers or non-lawyers, and three non-lawyer members were selected by the other six
commission members. Under the revision, the governor appoints all nine members of
each commission. Four of the lawyer members must be appointed from lists of nominees
submitted by the Florida Bar. The law also requires the governor to consider racial,
ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as geographic distribution, when making
appointments to the commission.
In 1991, the Florida legislature altered the composition of the state's judicial
nominating commissions to provide that one third of all members be women or members
of a racial or ethnic minority group. A white male who applied for a commission vacancy
was rejected because the position was reserved for a woman or minority, and he filed a
suit challenging the constitutionality of the diversity provision. The federal district court
found that the provision violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F.Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals without reported opinion in 1997.

Minorities in the Legal Profession
Issue
Studies have documented and many have observed that minorities are
significantly underrepresented at all levels of the legal profession as compared to their
numbers in the general population. Recognizing that the legal profession must not only
reflect the diversity of the society it serves, but also embrace the belief that fair
representation and equal access are essential to ensure a system of justice that is
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unbiased, many bar organizations on the national, state and local levels have taken
significant measures to promote equal opportunity for minority lawyers.
Background
In February 1984, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the Task Force
on Minorities in the Legal Profession. The Task Force was charged to investigate and
report on the problems facing minority lawyers and to submit recommendations designed
to promote the full integration of minority attorneys into the profession. In January 1986,
it issued its Task Force on Minorities in the Legal Profession: Report With
Recommendations. The task force concluded "the legal profession has remained a largely
segregated institution in which racial and ethnic minorities lacked equality of
opportunity." The report made nine recommendations which were adopted by the ABA:
"To promote full and equal participation in the profession by minorities and women." The
report also recommended the creation of a Commission on Opportunities for Minorities
in the Profession that would be charged with the responsibility of implementing a
program to achieve that goal.
In November 1989, The Florida Bar appointed the Commission on Equal
Opportunities in the Profession for a two-year term to address the low representation of
minority lawyers in Florida's legal community; the lack of minority participation within
the Bar; and means by which to improve opportunities in Florida for minority lawyers.
The Commission as one of its goals sought to increase hiring and advancement
opportunities for minority lawyers through its implementation of the Outside Counsel
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Program. This program was modeled after the ABA's successful Minority Outside
Counsel Demonstration Program, the purpose of which is to create opportunities for
minority attorneys to become outside counsel to corporations and governmental agencies.
In October 1990, the Commission sought to ascertain the level of participation of
minorities in the legal profession and determine any impediments or barriers of
participation by surveying the Bar membership to measure the attitudes and perceptions
of attorneys regarding equal opportunities for minorities in Florida's legal community. In
January 1992, the Membership Attitude Survey Report and Recommendations was
issued. The report made 14 recommendations one of which was to have The Florida Bar
formally adopt the ABA's goal of promoting full and equal participation in the profession
by minorities and women.
In May 1991, The Florida Bar Board of Governors voted to give the commission
a permanent presence in the Bar by appointing it as a standing committee. This
attainment has allowed the Committee on Equal Opportunities in the Profession to pursue
and accomplish its goals: to identify and seek to resolve discrimination within Florida's
legal community by increasing hiring and advancement opportunities for minorities and
women; improve the passage rate of minority law students; and serve as a clearinghouse
for opportunities and concerns of minorities and women who practice law in Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida also made efforts to address the dearth of minority
lawyers at all levels of the legal profession. Then Chief Justice Raymond Ehrlich issued
an administrative order creating the Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission
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(December 1989). This two-year commission's primary charge was to determine
"whether race or ethnicity affects the dispensation of justice in Florida." In December
1990 and 1991 respectively, the Commission issued its report and recommendations
covering an array of issues which included diversity in the judicial system, reexamination
of the adult and juvenile justice systems, law enforcement interaction with minorities, and
the unique experiences of minority attorneys in Florida.
The Minority Participation in Legal Education program awards scholarships to
blacks, Hispanics and American Indians in an effort to encourage minority participation
in the legal profession. But in 1996, only 70 of the 292 students who applied for the
scholarships received them. These statistics opened the debate for starting a new law
school. Rep. Al Lawson D-Tallahassee lobbied for the re-establishment of the Florida
A&M law school. Florida International University also put in its bid to be the site of
Florida's next law school.
Bills were introduced in the 1993 and 1999 Legislatures to create a third public
law school leading to a controversy among legislators as to whether that law school
would be associated with state's historically black university (Florida A&M) or the only
university with a near majority of Hispanic students (Florida International University).
On May 2, 2000, the Florida Senate voted unanimously to create two new law
schools in Florida one in South Florida at Florida International University and one for
Florida A&M University in Central Florida. The House also passed the bill and the
governor signed it into law soon after.
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In August 2002, the Florida A & M University College of Law and the Florida
International University College of Law opened their doors. These schools were created
to encourage minority students to pursue law.
The Florida Bar’s Position
In July 1993, The Florida Bar became one of a handful of state bars to adopt
specific language proscribing discriminatory practices by lawyers. In its Rules of
Professional Conduct (Chapter 4), the Bar amended Rule 4-8.4(d) Misconduct, to include
the following language: A lawyer shall not:
(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through
callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristics; . . .
The Board of Governors, at the recommendation of the Bar's Special Committee
for Gender Equality in the Profession and with endorsement of the Committee on Equal
Opportunities in the Profession, adopted a new aspirational policy calling for fair
representation of women and minorities in Bar groups -- "It is the policy of The Florida
Bar to ensure that all members, including women and minorities, have equal
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opportunities to be appointed to committee membership, committee leadership, and other
positions." At present, The Florida Bar has no legislative positions in this area.
The Florida Bar’s Involvement
With the establishment of the Committee on Equal Opportunities in the
Profession and the support of the Board of Governors, the Bar has taken significant steps
to increase the level of participation by minority lawyers in Bar activities as well as the
number of minorities entering the legal profession. The implementation and continued
development of the Committee's Business Development Conference has created and
expanded opportunities for minority attorneys to serve as outside counsel to
governmental agencies and private companies in Florida. In April 1993, the Board of
Governors approved the implementation of the Law Education Assistance Program
(LEAP). Funded by a grant from The Florida Bar Foundation, the program provided
stipends to African American law graduates to take The Florida Bar exam with
participating review course providers offering a one-for-one scholarship match. Matching
scholarships were available to all other minorities. The first seven scholarships were
awarded in December 1993, followed by 36 scholarships for July 1994 Florida Bar exam
applicants, 16 scholarships for February 1995 applicants and 44 for July 1995 Florida Bar
exam applicants. Due to depletion of grant funds, the program was discontinued,
following the July 1995 exam cycle.
The Young Lawyers Division commissioned a study by the National Center for
Higher Education Management Systems based in Tallahassee regarding how best to
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increase minority members studying to be lawyers. Although the analysts found that
minorities are seriously underrepresented in the legal profession, they recommended
additional scholarships and expanded part-time opportunities for student enrollment.
In June 2004, The Florida Bar Board of Governors held a diversity symposium
where they approved funding for two surveys proposed to get a more accurate picture of
the Bar's ethnic makeup and to survey minority bar associations as to why more
minorities are not participating in Bar activities. Incoming Bar President Kelly Johnson is
also setting up a Membership Outreach Committee to encourage minority participation.
Despite the fact that considerable scholarly attention has been given to questions of
judicial recruitment, selection and representation of the American judiciary by political
scientists since the 1960s, I argue that important substantive and empirical questions
remain unaddressed about racial, gender and ethical composition of the courts. In this
section, she said, “I plan to critique the extant research on diversity in Florida's courts.”
One brief explanation she argues for this gap in literature is grounded in the structural
nature of the American judiciary; meaning that a disproportionate amount of attention has
been placed on judicial recruitment and selection politics of federal judges. Accordingly,
the disparate dissimilar methods of selecting judges are often among appellate and trial
courts. Some studies of selection literature tend to indicate that upper court bias exist in
judicial recruitment and it focuses more on the appellate courts and argue that inadequate
attentions is being given to the trial courts. I explored the consequences of these research
trends which limited our understanding of diversity on the Florida bench.
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Why is diversification so important? Those who advocate diversity within
government frequently argue that overwhelmingly white and male political institutions do
not adequately represent the diverse interests of the mass public. This notion of the courts
as representative institutions is, of course not new. Seats have been set aside for particular
regions or religions, though such regional and religious considerations are less relevant
today (Sciligiano, 1971). The foundation of many arguments for increased gender
diversity is the belief that, whether because of biological, psychological, or sociological
differences, women bring a different set of attitudes and beliefs, and different areas of
experience and expertise to policy making (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994: Sapiro,
1981). Likewise, the experience of Blacks differs noticeably from the experience of other
citizens. Yet, at the same time, an ongoing debate has taken place about how to balance
merit considerations and diversification. Some individual argue that regardless of
political ideology that eventually color nor gender will not have any effect on judicial
appointments.
However, history has demonstrated in the last two decades before Ronald Regan's
appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the U.S. Supreme Court, a great deal of political
discussions have been placed on the lack of diversity within the court system. Even
during the administration of George H.W. Bush, he claims that "race" did not have an
influence on his decision to maintain racial diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court after
Thurgood Marshall resigned in 1991, even though Justice Marshall acknowledged that
race would certainly be a factor in the choice (Wines, Michael, 1991). In the presidential
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debate of 1992, Bill Clinton stated that "I think I owe the American people a White
House staff, a Cabinet and appointments that look like America but that meet high
standards of excellence, and that's what I'll do." (Goldman, Sheldon, 2000). Clinton
followed up this statement throughout his presidency by appointing women and
minorities to the courts.
According to the Board of Bar Examiners there has been substantial improvement
in minority representation in the legal profession but no statistical information has been
maintained. However, since the implementation of the Minority Participation in Legal
Education Program (MPLE) by the Florida Legislature in 1994, law schools have
reported the program has had a significant impact as law school recruiters can go out with
a scholarship in hand and recruit the brightest minority candidates. (Board of Bar
Examiners, July 1997).
In a 1999 joint poll, Race and the Law, by the American Bar Association and the
National Bar Association, 52% of black lawyers answered that there is "very much"
racial bias in the current justice system. Nearly 30% of white lawyers answered there is
"very little." Also, nearly 67% of black lawyers said they had witnessed an example of
racial bias in the justice system within the past three years. But more than 82% of white
lawyers said they had not witnessed an instance of racial bias.39
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Prepared by the Public Information and Bar Services Department with
assistance from the Public Service Programs Department The Florida Bar June 2004.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
The documentation review method was used to measure the data collected in this
research. The advantages for using this method were first, to obtain comprehensive and
historical information that already exists and secondly, to obtain data which demonstrates
few biases about the information.
I used correlation as a non-experimental, description method because the
variables are not directly manipulated, as they would be if used in an experimental
method. This method of research is really more of a mathematical technique for
summarizing data. This study was designed to determine the degree and direction of
relationship between two or more variables or measures of behavior. For example, as the
number of female and minority appointments increase on the JNC it is more likely that
qualified female or minority judicial candidates will advance through committee.
Race data collection is about accountability. It will allow us to look at racial
disparities in the aggregate so we can address the specific—by moving us from anecdotes
to empirical evidence and from empirical evidence to action. Beyond initiatives to collect
race data, Florida’s judiciary has undertaken additional efforts to change the policies and
practices that often lead to gender and racial disparities. These findings are discussed
under the facts and statistics listed below.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Facts and Statistics
Diversity in 2004 judicial appointments is a high priority in Florida’s present
administration. Their goal is to have a judicial system composed of judges who reflect the
people they serve. Since judges have so much influence over the lives of people of the
state, it is important that all Floridians perceive the judiciary legitimate. Having a diverse
judiciary serves the goal. Consistent with its policies in other areas, Florida’s
administration believes that a diverse judiciary can and should be achieved without the
use of quotas. Instead, they have pursued the goal of diversity through outreach and by
giving careful consideration to every applicant.
•

The Bush/Jennings team appointed the first African American woman,
Judge Peggy Quince to the Florida Supreme Court (with the agreement of
Governor Lawton Chiles)

•

The Bush/Jennings team appointed minorities to 53 judicial positions
including the first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero to the
Supreme Court (26 African American, 26 Hispanics, 1 other)

•

The Bush/Jennings team appointed women to 66 judicial position

•

The Bush/Jennings team appointed the first Haitian-American judge,
Judge Fred Seraphin to the Miami Dade County Court.
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In 1990 less than 5.6% and 3.6% of the membership of the judicial nominating
commissions were, respectively, African American and Hispanic. Almost half the
commissions had no minority members at all in 1990. As of January 1994, Hispanics
account for 11.2% of the judicial nominating commission members and African
Americans make up 24.7% of the members. All of the commissions have minority
members (The Florida Bar, January 1994).
Minorities are significantly underrepresented in Florida's large law firms,
particularly those not located in the Miami area. African American attorneys represent
less than 1.6% of attorneys in large firms both inside and outside the Miami area.
Hispanics account for only 1.7% of attorneys employed by large firms outside Miami.
(Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, 1991).
A stark disparity exists in the passage rate of white and black candidates on the
Florida Bar exam. Specifically for the February 1991 administration, 74% of the White
candidates passed the Florida and multistate portions of the exam, while only 39% of the
black candidates passed the exam. For the July administration, 76% of the whites passed,
while only 46% of the blacks passed. (ref. see above).
Nationally, applications are down to ABA-accredited law schools from about
100,000 in 1990-91 to less than 70,000 a year. In Florida, there were 4,925 applicants in
1991-92, the peak year. In 1999 there were 3,675, or a 25 percent decline. (The Florida
Bar News, April 30, 1999).
During the same time, African-American applications have risen 22 percent to
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468 while Hispanic applications have declined eight percent. (ref. see above).
U.S. Census EEO files for 1990 for lawyers and judges in Florida show
participation rates of 7.4% for Hispanics and 2.6% for African Americans, yielding a
total minority participation rate of 10% (National Center for Higher Education
Management Systems, 1993).
The respective proportions of Hispanic and African American persons in the
Florida population by the 1990 Census was 12.2% and 13.6% respectively in Florida (ref.
see above).
Minority participation in other professions is greater, at least for Hispanics.
Minorities comprised over 20% of the population of physicians (17.7% Hispanic, 2.4%
African American and 12% dentists (10.6% Hispanic and 1.7% African American) (ref.
see above).
No single minority group in the United States accounts for more than 4% of the
lawyers in the U.S. (Law School Admissions Council, August 2000).
According to the 1990 Census, a total of 56.7% of the minority population of
Florida reside in the seven counties surrounding Miami; this includes 74.3% of the state's
Hispanic population and 42% of the African Americans (ref. see above).
Over four fifths of all lawyers who responded to the Bar survey believe that a
third Florida public law school should not be created. (1993 Membership Attitude
Survey).
The number of law school applicants is on the downswing. According to a report
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from the Law School Admission Council, applicants for 1993 were down 5.9 percent
nationally, and the number of applications decreased 5.6 percent. Applications to Florida
schools were down 7.8 percent for fall 1993. Only one law school reported an increase in
fall applications -- Florida State University, at 4.4 percent. Stetson reported the worst
decline in applications at 15.7 percent. University of Florida applications were down 7
percent; University of Miami's down 9.2 percent; St. Thomas University's down 5.9
percent; and Nova's down 11.2 percent (Florida Bar News, November 1, 1993).
According to the 1994 Florida Bar dues statement of 31,481 respondents 28,803 are
White, 1,834 are Hispanic, 666 are African American, 120 are Asian or Pacific Islander
and 58 are American Indian or Alaskan.
The 1994 Economics and Law Office Management Survey indicate that
approximately 94 percent of Bar members are White, 4 percent are Hispanic and 2
percent are African American.
The 1996 Economics and Law Office Management Survey indicate that
approximately 93 percent of Bar members are White, 5 percent are Hispanic, and 2
percent are African American.
The 1998 Economics and Law Office Management Survey indicates that
approximately 91 percent of Bar members are White, 6 percent are Hispanic, 2 percent
are African-American, and 2 percent are of another minority.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
In closing, I realize that our courts cannot be sensitive to issues of ethnic, race and
gender diversity and how they impact females, minorities, and people of color unless the
makeup of the court reflects the communities we serve. You may ask, why does race
matter? After all, parties are not entitled to have a jury with a particular gender or racial
makeup or a judge of their choice. Indeed, at least in theory, if judges are truly impartial,
it should not matter what race they are. While that is a valid point, I think it misses
something important.
First, a vital part of the richness of what the judiciary does is the varied
background and experience of those who serve as judges. Those differences in
background and experience make us all better. Second, and more important, if people are
to have trust and confidence in the people who serve in the judiciary, they should see
some people who look like them when they come into contact with the judicial system,
people who may have shared some of the same experiences they have shared and, thus,
someone with an understanding of and sensitivity to the life experiences they have had.
How can you have confidence in the judicial system if the judges in that system cannot
relate to who you are? The judicial system has an obligation to provide equal opportunity
to the extent that females, minorities, and people of color have the temperament, the legal
educational background, the skills, and the abilities necessary to sit on Florida’s bench.
In 2001, the Legislature revised the statute relating to the appointment of
members of the state's judicial nominating commissions. Prior to the change, three lawyer
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members were appointed by the Florida Bar, three members were appointed by the
governor and could be either lawyers or non-lawyers, and three non-lawyer members
were selected by the other six commission members. Under the revision, the governor
appoints all nine members of each commission. Four of the lawyer members must be
appointed from lists of nominees submitted by the Florida Bar. The law also requires the
governor to consider racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as geographic
distribution, when making appointments to the commission.
Finally, when people go to court and see a judge who looks like them, they are
more likely to have confidence that they will be treated fairly and a more diverse group of
judges brings a broader set of life experiences that can enrich the decision-making
process. Some minority and women judges will not be appointed unless more women and
minority lawyers with solid records and a willingness to serve step forward and seek
judicial nominations. The legal profession also has an obligation to encourage more
minorities and women to consider a career in law. The governor’s most recent selections
indicate that he is serious about improving diversity on the Florida bench.
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